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Abstract 
 
The paper aims at providing a Game Theory model of coopetition 
which addresses the problem of the global Green Economy. The Green 
Economy is a theoretical model of sustainable development. This 
sustainable development model should lead to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases, determine the reduction of global pollution and the 
establishment of a sustainable and lasting global Green Economy, using 
mainly renewable resources. 
 
The paper applies the notion of coopetition, originally devised at 
microeconomic level, at a country level. The country has to decide 
whether it wants to collaborate with the rest of the world in getting an 
efficient Green Economy, even if the country is competing in the global 
scenario. 
 
The model provides a win-win solution, that shows the 
convenience for each country to participate actively to a program of 
sustainability and efficient resource allocation within a coopetitive 
framework. 
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1 Introduction 
 
A Green Economy is an economy based on sustainable development and a knowledge 
of ecological economics. Thus the Green Economy is one that results in improved 
human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks 
and ecological scarcities. 
 
In this paper we apply the notion of coopetition, devised by Branderburger and Nalebuff 
(1995) (Stiles (2001)) in the field of strategic management, to the green economy. The 
notion of coopetition is a complex construct, since according to this concept, the 
economic agents (i.e. firms or countries) must seek to change the game and find a win-
win solution, that indicates a situation in which each agent thinks about both 
cooperative and competitive ways to change the game. The win-win solution is therefore 
a situation in which each agent must cooperate and compete at the same time. 
 
In the present work we apply a coopetitive model at a macroeconomic level to find 
appropriate solutions for a green economy, the notion of coopetition is then applied at 
country level, instead of microeconomic firm level. The country has to decide whether it 
wants to collaborate with the rest of the world in getting an efficient Green Economy, 
even if the country is competing in the global scenario. 
 
Our model will provide a win-win solution, which is going to show the convenience for 
each country to participate actively to a program of sustainability and efficient resource 
allocation within a coopetitive framework. 
 
The three main variables of our coopetitive model are:  
 x representing the strategy of any country c; 
 y representing the strategy of the rest of the world w; 
 z representing the coopetitive sustainability strategy. 
 
In this paper we suggest an original analytical model of coopetitive games 
applied at the global environment, with the aim to enrich the set of tools for 
environmental policies. 
 
The paper aims at demonstrating the strategies that could bring to feasible 
solutions in a coopetitive perspective between a given country and the rest of the world, 
by offering a win-win outcome for both players and to establish a true efficient resource 
allocation for a Green Economy at a global level. 
 
 
2 An Analytical Framework of Coopetitive Games 
 
In this section we provide a general analytical framework of coopetition, a model of 
cooopetitive game introduced by David Carfì in the last two years. This suggested 
analytical framework enables us to wide the set of possible solutions in a coopetitive 
context and it allows us “to share the pie fairly” in a win-win scenario. At the same 
time, it permits to examine the range of possible economic outcomes along a coopetitive 
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dynamic path. Finally, it limits the space within which the coopetitive solutions can be 
determined. 
 
 
2.1 Coopetitive games 
 
The basic definition we propose of coopetitive game is the following one, recently 
introduced by D. Carfì. 
 
Definition (of coopetitive game). Let E, F and C be three nonempty sets. We define two 
players coopetitive gain game carried by the strategic triple (E,F,C) any pair of the 
form G = (f, >), where f is a function from the Cartesian product E × F × C into the real 
Euclidean plane and > is the usual order of the Cartesian plane, defined, for every 
couple of points p, q, by p > q iff pi > qi, for each index i. 
 
Remark. The difference among a two person normal-form gain game and a two person 
coopetitive game is simply the presence of the third strategy Cartesian-factor C. 
 
Terminology and notation. Let G = (f, >) be a two players coopetitive gain game 
carried by the strategic triple (E, F, C). We will use the following terminologies: 
 
- the function f is called the payoff function of the game G; 
 
- the first component f1 of the payoff function f is called the payoff function of the first 
player and analogously the second component f2 is called the payoff function of the 
second player; 
 
- the set E is said the strategy set of the first player, the set F the strategy set of the 
second player; 
 
- the set C the cooperative strategy set of the two players. 
 
- the Cartesian product E × F × C is called the coopetitive strategy space of the game G. 
 
Memento. The first component f1 of the payoff function f of a coopetitive game G is the 
function of the strategy space of the game G into the real line defined by f1(x,y,z) = 
pr1(f(x,y,z)), analogously we proceed for the second component f2. 
 
Interpretation. We have two players, each of them has a strategy set in which to choose 
his strategy; moreover, the two players can cooperatively choose a strategy z in a third 
set C. The two players will choose their cooperative strategy z to maximize (in some 
sense) the gain function f. 
 
Bargaining solutions of a coopetitive game. The payoff function of a two person 
coopetitive game is (as in the case of normal-form game) a vector valued function with 
values belonging to the Cartesian plane R2; so that we should consider the maximal 
Pareto boundary of the payoff space im(f) as an appropriate zone for the bargaining 
solutions. 
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The family of normal form games associated with a coopetitive game. For any 
cooperative strategy z selected in the cooperative strategy space C there is a 
corresponding normal form game 
 
 Gz = (fz, >) 
 
upon the strategy pair (E,F) and with payoff function the section 
 
 f(. , z) : E × F → R2, 
 
of the payoff function f of the coopetitive game (the section is defined, as usual, on the 
competitive strategy space E × F by 
 
 f(., z)(x) = f(x, z), 
 
for every bi-strategy x in the bi-strategy space E × F). 
 
 
2. 2 General solutions of a coopetitive game 
 
 
The two players should choose the cooperative strategy z in order that: 
 
- the Nash equilibria of Gz are “better” than the Nash equilibria in each other 
game Gz’; 
 
 - the supremum of Gz is greater than the supremum of any other game Gz’; 
 
- the Pareto maximal boundary of Gz is “higher” than that of any other game 
Gz’; 
 
 - the Nash bargaining solution is better in Gz than that in Gz’; 
 
and so on, fixed a common kind of solutions, for any game Gz, say S(z) the set of these 
kind of solutions, we can consider the problem to find the optimal solutions in set 
valued path S, defined on the cooperative strategy set C. 
 
We note the fundamental circumstance that, in general, the above criteria are multi-
criteria and so they generate multi-criteria optimization problems. 
 
For the formal definitions of the basic kind of solutions see Carfì-Schilirò “A model of 
Coopetitive game and the Greek crisis”. 
 
Let us formalize the concept of normal-form game-family associated with a coopetitive 
game. 
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Definition (the family associated with a coopetitive game). Let G = (f, >) be a two 
person coopetitive gain game carried by the strategic triple (E, F, C). We naturally can 
associate with the game a family of competitive games G = (Gz)z∈C, which we will 
denote by the same symbol G and which we call the family of normal-form games 
associated with the coopetitive game G. 
 
Applicative remark. It is clear that with any family of normal form games G = (Gz)z∈C 
we can associate 
 
- a family of payoff spaces (im(fz))z∈C, 
 
- a family of Pareto maximal boundary (bd*Gz)z∈C; 
 
- a family of suprema (sup Gz)z∈C; 
 
and so on.  
 
And we can interpret any of the above families as set-valued paths in the strategy space 
E×F. 
 
It is just the study of these induced families which becomes of great interest in the study 
of a coopetitive game G. 
 
 
2.3 A model of coopetitive games 
 
 
The coopetitive model we propose hereunder must be interpreted as normative models, 
in the sense that it will show the more appropriate solutions of a win-win strategy 
chosen within a cooperative perspective. 
 
The main variables of the two models are: 
 
 strategies x of a certain country C (the investment in agricultural and food 
production), which directly influence both pay-off function; 
 
 strategies y of the rest of the word (the investment in agricultural and food 
production) which increase both pay-off function;  
 
 a shared strategy z which is determined together by the two countries, c and 
the rest of the world w: z is the level of investment for environmental and natural 
resources.  
 
Therefore, in the model we assume that c and w define the set of coopetitive strategies. 
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3 A sustainable coopetitive model of economy 
 
 
Main Strategic assumptions. We assume that any real number x, in the canonical unit 
interval U = [0,1], is a possible investment of the country c in agricultural and food 
production and any real number y, in the same unit interval U, is the analogous 
investment of the rest of the world w. Moreover, a real number z, again in U, is the total 
investment of c and w for sustainability of natural resources and for the environmental 
protection. Let us assume that the country c and the rest of the world w contribute, for 
the common investment z, according to the pair of percentages (q, r), in such a way that 
we have z = qz + rz. 
We also consider, as payoff functions of c and w, two Cournot type payoff functions. 
 
 Payoff function of c 
 
We assume that the payoff function of the country c is the function f1 of the unit cube 
U3 into the real line, defined by  
 
 f1(x, y, z) = x (1 - x - y) + mz, 
 
for every triple (x, y, z) in the cube U3, where m is a characteristic positive real number 
depending upon the country c. 
 
Payoff function of w 
 
We assume that the payoff function of w is the function f2 of the cube U3 into the real 
line, defined by  
 
 f2(x, y, z) = y (1 - x - y) + nz, 
 
for every triple (x, y, z) in the cube U3 , where n is a characteristic positive real number 
depending upon w. 
 
 Payoff function of the coopetitive game 
 
We so have build up a coopetitive gain game G = (f, >) with payoff function f given by  
 
f(x, y, z) = (x (1 - x - y) + mz, y (1 - x - y) + nz) 
= (x (1 - x - y), y (1 - x - y)) + z(m, n), 
 
for every triple (x, y, z) in the cube U3. 
 
 
4. Study of the game G = (p, >). 
 
Note that, fixed a cooperative strategy z in U, the game G(z) = (p(z), >) with payoff 
function p(z), defined on the square U2 by 
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 p(z)(x, y) = f(x, y, z), 
 
is the translation of the game G(0) by the vector v(z) = z(m, n), so that we can study the 
game G(0) and then we can translate the various information of the game G(0) by the 
vector v(z). 
 
So let us consider the game G(0). The last game G0 has been studied completely by D. 
Carfì in Topics in Game Theory, Gabbiano 2011. The conservative part in payoff space 
(the part of the payoff space greater than the conservative bi-value (0,0)) is the 
canonical 2-simplex T, convex envelope of the origin and of the canonical basis e of the 
Euclidean plane R2. 
  
 Payoff space and Pareto Boundary of the payoff space of G(z) 
 
The Pareto boundary of the payoff space of G(z) is the segment [e1, e2], with end points 
the two canonical vectors of the plane R2, translated by the vector v(z) = z(m, n). 
 
 The payoff space of the coopetitive game G, the image of the payoff function f, 
is the union of the family of payoff spaces 
 
 (im p(z))z∈C, 
 
that is the convex envelope of the of points 0, e1, e2, and of their translations by the 
vector v(1) = (m, n). 
 
The Pareto maximal boundary of the payoff space f(S) of the coopetitive game G is the 
segment [P’, Q’], where the point P’ is the translation e1 + v(1) and the point Q’ is the 
point e2 + v(1). 
 
 
5 Solutions of the model and conclusions 
 
 
1) Properly coopetitive solution. In a purely coopetitive fashion, the solution of the 
game in the payoff space is the translation of the Nash payoff (1/9, 1/9) by the vector 
(m, n); that is, in the strategic cube S the solution (1/3,1/3,1). This solution is obtained 
by cooperating on the set C and competing a la Nash in the game G(1). 
 
2) The Nash bargaining solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution, with 
respect to the infimum of the Pareto boundary, coincide with the medium point M of the 
segment [P’, Q’]. This point M represents a win-win solution with respect to the initial 
(shadow maximum) supremum (1,1) iff m and n are greater than 1. 
 
3) A best Pareto fair division is the division according to the pair (p,q) i.e. the point 
 
 pP’+qQ’, 
 
which is nothing but the translation (p,q) + v(1). Note that, as before, we have 
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(p+m, q+n) > (1,1), 
 
if m and n are greater than 1. 
 
4) Since the Pareto boundary is a segment of straight line with slope -1, the Pareto 
transferable utility boundary of the game G contains the Pareto boundary itself. So that 
a natural coopetitive solution is again the Pareto fair division according to the pair (p,q). 
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